

**The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan –
An International Terrorist Organization
or a Pioneer for a Social Struggle?**

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**Regional Studies
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2004-2005

Re-defining the IMU

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is considered by governments around the world – most notably the United States – to be a terrorist organization associated with al-Qaeda. But a close look at the group and its declared goals paints, instead, a picture of political struggle against a truly oppressive regime.

Scholarly literature about political Islam in Central Asia locates the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (henceforth, the IMU) on the radical end of the spectrum, alongside international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. This paper will provide a critical look at this supposition. It will begin by reviewing the past activities attributed to the IMU and background information about the movement. The political context within which the IMU emerged will follow. Then the paper will discuss the common attitudes and perceptions towards the group and the interests underlying them, compared to the actual ideology and activity of the group. The paper will conclude with thoughts about the situation those attitudes cause: a dead-end situation or a hope for a change.

It is important to point out that there is not much primary information available about the IMU. Its activity is clandestine, so any information is uncertain. The written material regarding the IMU is interwoven with words such as supposedly, allegedly, suspected, reportedly. The following account can demonstrate this point: "It has been persistently rumored that Namangani, declared dead and buried last year, appeared in the Afghan province of Badakhshan"¹. If the dead leader can resurrect, it is hard to tell which part of the information is reliable. The vagueness surrounding the IMU only made it more interesting for me to write about the reactions they induced.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: a profile

Upon independence in the states of the former Soviet Union, people were seeking for a new identity. Islam was looked upon as one of the main sources for the forging of one². But expressing a pious Muslim belief was not supported by the regime in Uzbekistan. President Islam Karimov's regime launched a campaign against Muslim activity, suppressing almost any manifestation of Islam. One can track the origins of the IMU from this oppression. Thus, the initial goal of the IMU, which was established in Afghanistan by Muslims who fled Uzbekistan, was to overthrow President Karimov³. Tahir Yoldashev was its leader, and Juma Namangani, an ex-Soviet soldier, was the field commander⁴. The nature of the activity was region encompassing. IMU fighters joined the Islamic Tajik Opposition in the Tajik civil war between 1992 and 1997⁵. In Afghanistan, the IMU set training camps and formed closed ties with both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Bin Laden was one of the predominant sponsors of the IMU⁶. An additional financial resource for the IMU has come from narco-trafficking. The IMU has been heavily involved in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Central Asia⁷, and was also accused by the authorities as being responsible for explosions in Tashkent in February

1999. In August 1999 and August 2000, a few thousand IMU fighters invaded Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and kidnapped civilians⁸.

The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 caused heavy losses to the IMU, but it was not wiped out entirely as was thought. Apparently, IMU members moved to Pakistan and their presence in Central Asia was not pronounced in the following two years.

In March 2004, suicide bombing, explosions and gunfire in Tashkent and Bukhara have shaken Uzbekistan. The violence resulted in 47 dead, including 33 alleged terrorists, 10 police officers and 4 civilians, and more than 30 injured⁹. The authorities were unable to determine who was behind the attacks. Despite the uncertainty and lack of evidence, the first reaction of the government was to blame the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Islamic militants. Later, the police announced that the IMU is on the top of their list of suspects¹⁰. "Security experts" also pointed a finger towards the IMU. In July 2004 the Uzbek government accused a new movement, Tabligh Jamaat, of being behind the attacks¹¹.

The present estimations of the strength and location of the IMU vary, and the various collection of opinions illustrates this. The US State Department, in spite of the September 2002 redesignation of the IMU as a foreign terrorist organization¹², evaluates their strength as fewer than 700 militants¹³. Others argue "They are extremely professional fighters...they are equipped with Thuraya satellite phones and military maps, and they are well exercised and battle-hardened"¹⁴. A senior Western diplomat reiterated this assertion after the March 2004 events: "There have been signs that the IMU are regrouping and forming terror-like cells instead of armed units. I think this might be a link up with al-Qaeda and the IMU". In contrast, another analyst at the same period of time asserted: "The IMU have been out of the picture for ages. They're finished"¹⁵.

Regarding the possible location of the group today, some hold that IMU members operate at the Southern Waziristan tribal area in Pakistan¹⁶. Others, however, believe they no longer have a network of support from the local population— especially after the native militants were granted an amnesty by the Pakistani government¹⁷. Kazakh army officials claim that the IMU operates covertly in Kazakhstan¹⁸.

Uncertainty surrounds the survival of the leaders too. Namangani is believed to have been killed in Afghanistan. Yoldashev might have been wounded in battles in March 2004 between the Pakistani army and the militants in Waziristan¹⁹. Apparently the group also faces financial difficulties, in that some of its potential sponsors are focusing in Iraq.

The political context in Uzbekistan

In order to analyze the activities and significance of the IMU, it is crucial to examine the political background from which it emulated.

Subsequent to the demise of the Soviet Union, the attitude of the new regime in Uzbekistan towards Islam was ambivalent. On the one hand, it gave lip service to Islam;

embracing Islam – a religion which represents the cultural heritage of the Uzbeks – helped the regime gain legitimacy and bolster national identity. On the other hand, the regime remained secular and the ruling elite, which belonged to the Communist Party, maintained its traditional hostility to Islam²⁰.

In this context it is important to note that the totalitarian regime in Uzbekistan does not allow opposition of any sort. Oppositionists - both secular and Muslim - are routinely incarcerated, tortured and forced into exile. The perception of Islamic opposition to the government as a threat to the secular regime, however, entails special attention on the part of the authorities, and yields a policy of fierce repression of any expression of Islam. There is absolute state control in Uzbekistan over religious practices, even more than in the Soviet era. It manifests itself in control over Islamic education, appointments of religious leaders, registration of mosques, and restrictions on the wearing of religious clothing in public and the growing of a beard, among other things²¹.

Each violent disturbance exacerbates the oppressive state's policies towards Muslims. The bombings in Tashkent in 1999 prompted the security services to exert far-reaching repression, particularly against imams believed to be "Wahhabis". Excessive arrests of Islamists, but also ordinary pious Muslims, took place²². Similarly, following the explosions in March 2004, thousands of people were arrested for Islamic activism and subversion. Most of them were suspected Hizb-ut-Tahrir or IMU supporters²³. The regular arrests and harassments involve high levels of corruption by the policemen, who abuse their unlimited power by threatening an arrest in order to get bribes²⁴. The ubiquitous corruption prevails also in the justice system: currently there are more than 6,000 Islamist prisoners, who, according to human rights activists, were forced to confess by torture and got their sentences after show trials.

International laws and Human rights such as the right of expression, freedom of religion, public assembly, due process and prohibition on torture are violated severely²⁵. Uzbekistan is termed "not free" and ranks 6.5 out of 7 in Freedom House's rankings of political freedoms and civil rights²⁶. The bleak human rights situation, specifically oppression of Muslims, coupled with a stagnant economy, extreme poverty and mistrust in the state's organs, provides the backdrop against which Islamic resistance groups such as IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have emerged.

Fundamentalism, terrorism or a legitimate resistance?

Despite the cultural, structural and direct violence that the severe oppression the Uzbek rule employs through terrorizing police force, and the impossibility of changing the regime democratically (Karimov has extended his tenure time again with non-free elections and outlawing of opposition parties), yet the resistance of the IMU is often termed "terrorist", "fundamentalist", and radical. I am not trying to downplay the violent path the IMU chose, but I submit that it is important to examine the attitudes toward the IMU in light of the nature of its activity and the stated demands of the movement.

In order to understand whether the IMU could be defined as a fundamentalist organization, it is useful to interpret fundamentalism. Noorani, while reminding us that fundamentalism is not a phenomenon unique to the Islamic faith, opines that fundamentalism consists of "revivalism, hostility towards minorities, anti-intellectualism, intolerance, arrogant insularity, intellectual bankruptcy and moral blindness", based on a deep religious belief²⁷. Additionally, fundamentalism does not offer a well-thought out strategy for social betterment and equality, economic progress or any political plan. Olivier Roy, an acknowledged authority in Political Islam, suggests al-Qaeda as an example of a fundamentalist organization lacking a political plan, whose sole interest is in offering the possibility of vengeance to the frustrated without providing hope or alternative²⁸. Noorani opines that this is characteristic of all fundamentalists²⁹. Interestingly, the regime of Uzbekistan, having these features, could well be described as fundamentalist, with the exception of the religious element.

The Islamic fundamentalism, specifically, is motivated by two main goals: the creation of an Islamic state and the use of jihad [holy war or struggle] as the means for its realization³⁰.

As mentioned above, the IMU was formed with a clear political goal of toppling Karimov and replacing his regime with an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Reportedly, the initial goal evolved to include the whole of Central Asia under an Islamic regime. Some even argue that similarly to the Taliban, the IMU is interested in bringing about a world-wide Islamic state³¹. But does mere cooperation between the Taliban or bin-Laden and the IMU mean that they share the same final goal? It is hard to say. However, examination of the open letter the IMU sent to the government of Uzbekistan during the raids in August 2000 sheds light on its ideology and aims³²:

"We demand that hundreds of thousands of innocent believers, including women, who are being tortured in prisons, people who have been falsely charged and put in prisons and sentenced to death, should be immediately freed, mosques and sacred places which have been shut should be given *back to the people*, female believers should be allowed to wear veil and men to grow beards, as prescribed by our Prophet, and the ongoing repressions against the Muslims should be immediately stopped. We warn that various slanders and fabrications addressed to *our Muslims* and our Islamic movement should be stopped. Otherwise we will take revenge and create difficulties for the police force, prosecutor's office, the National security Service, as they deserve. Our fight will continue until blasphemy, violence, aggression, cheating, bribery have been wiped out [and until] the Holy Koran has been established, consists of pure Islamic justice, morals, law, peace and honesty³³ [SIC]. (Emphasis added)

In light of the above-mentioned traits of fundamentalism in general and Islamic fundamentalism specifically, and given the scarcity in primary resources about the IMU, it is problematic to pin down whether it fits the definition of Islamic fundamentalism. But analyzing this letter, I find that the IMU defies the definition of fundamentalism³⁴.

Instead, there is a clear demand for social, cultural, economic and civil human rights. The IMU requests reform and freedom of religion for both men and women. They appeal to due process. They fearlessly talk about state corruption, oppression and violence of the government. They clearly aim their resistance towards the state's security and justice organs and not towards the entire civilian population as a terror organization does. Their appeal to the people, to the society as a whole, implies components of social mobilization and social struggle.

Moreover, in this letter there is no trace of an ambition to go beyond national borders and to establish a regional, let alone global, Islamic state. The letter was submitted to the government of Uzbekistan. The focus is on changing the repressive measures of the government towards freedom of religion, and not on changing the government because it is secular in order to establish a religious state. There is a sharp discrepancy between the titles applied to the IMU and the legitimate demands as expressed in this letter.

Referring to the group as a terrorist group is equally dubious. The incursions of 1999 and 2000, according to ICG were "much closer to guerilla insurgency than an international terrorist action"³⁵. But the IMU was still honored with classification in the International Terrorists Groups by the United States government.

The nature of the March 2004 events also questions the IMU's status as an international terrorist organization (if it was behind it at all). Some claim the aim of the attacks was to protest against the corrupt and brutal regime by targeting its symbols: the policemen³⁶. Starr also notes that the targets of the bombers have been mainly police and not the army or other government institutions. He raises the possibility that the acts were acts of revenge against the police, carried out by families of those who have been arrested and put in jail in charge of religious extremism³⁷.

Others say that whereas the first suicide bomber, a woman in Tashkent, was clearly targeting police, the tactic used by 20 other suspects was different. They blew themselves up in a building surrounded by police, where the only victims could be themselves. They did not choose to blow themselves up in crowded places, to resist arrest, to take hostages or to surrender. As the journalist Sergei Yezhkov believes: "I don't think this was terrorism in the classic sense of the term 'terrorism'. This was a mass act of protest, an action brought about by desperation...by the social and rights situation in Uzbekistan...These were people who had lost all hope of conducting a political dialogue with the authorities, and they simply demonstrated their discontent and disagreement with the authorities"³⁸.

I propose that in view of the nature of the IMU's activities – i.e. small-scale sporadic armed attacks and limited incursions, suicide bombings with no additional casualties (keeping in mind that the bombings on March 2004 might have been undertaken by other militants) – do not suffice for labeling the group as either fundamentalist or terrorist. Naming them political opponents or rebels seems to me more adequate. Moreover, the IMU can be considered as the initiator of a future social movement. According to Tarrow's model, collective confrontational actions such as the actions that the IMU took form an essential part of the creation of any social movement³⁹.

De-legitimizing the IMU: who and why?

Haines, a social movements scholar, offers the "radical flank effects" model to explain the phenomenon whereby radical groups are demonized. According to Haines, the radical activities of one group towards the establishment (which often include militant actions), can cause a positive effect when as a result of the struggle, the regime initiates dialogue with the moderate groups. It usually occurs at the expense of the radical group, which is de-legitimized and pushed away. As Chetrit puts it: "One is shaking the tree, and the other is picking the fruits"⁴⁰. A negative effect takes place when the regime in response to the militancy oppresses the struggle all together, including the moderate groups. Haines derives another important conclusion from his research on social movements: what is considered radical yesterday could be defined as moderate tomorrow⁴¹.

Using the terms "terrorism" and "fundamentalism" is part and parcel of a process of the de-legitimization and demonization of the group, used by the regime and so-called "security experts" alike. This process includes manipulation of information and exaggeration of the magnitude of their actions. In the statement propagated by the State Department of the U.S. upon redesignation of the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it is stated that the IMU "is responsible for criminal acts of terrorism against the citizens of Uzbekistan and has also kidnapped foreigners, including four **American mountain climbers** who were held hostage in 2000 before being able to **escape**"⁴². Another source reveals, however, that in fact the hostages were released unharmed⁴³. The omission of the context in which the action took place and the language are aimed to demonize the IMU. Another method of de-legitimization is comparing the IMU with al-Qaeda: "...**hardcore terrorist groups** such as al Qaeda, or its local allies, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan"⁴⁴.

Another prevalent method of de-legitimization of the IMU is ignoring the local-political element in its ideology. Reviewing the IMU's origin and evolution, one of the analysts does not even bother to mention its declared goal of toppling Karimov⁴⁵. Others blame the IMU for rejecting any opportunities to achieve its goals by way of political actions and negotiations while ignoring the totalitarian political reality in Uzbekistan and the fact that the regime itself does not make any attempts to dialogue with opposition⁴⁶.

The de-legitimization of the IMU is partly instrumental to security advisers and scholars in distinguishing between radical and moderate voices - between good and evil - thus making a complex situation more intelligible and simple. Depicting the IMU as radical and dangerous, allows for a more tolerant attitude towards other Islamic oppositionists. For instance, Atal suggests that democratic opposition should not be regarded as Islamic fundamentalism, and that the U.S. should differentiate between the two. "Thus, groups like the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU need to be recognized as a serious regional and global threat, separate from local issues that may be fueling their spread"⁴⁷.

The regime has its own interests in portraying the IMU and other insurgent Islamic groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, as dangerous terrorists⁴⁸. By doing so, the regime achieves two goals. First and foremost, Karimov gets to hold on to power. He uses the magic word

"terror" as a cover to eliminate the mere sign of any political opposition⁴⁹. Secondly, joining the U.S.-led coalition against terror and hosting its base on the territory of Uzbekistan yields a lot of money, which does not necessarily go to the 80% poor population of Uzbekistan⁵⁰.

The manipulative use Karimov makes of the word "terror" is apparent to some, as demonstrated by the following words of a former political prisoner:

Did the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan threaten Uzbekistan, or was it the other way around? Who threatened whom? The IMU wasn't really dangerous for the government; it was against the Karimov dictatorship. But, Karimov is dangerous for them. He's more dangerous than Saddam Hussein⁵¹.

The vicious cycle of violence

Unfortunately, the violence of March 2004 provided the regime with yet another excuse to strengthen the persecution of Muslims. The harsh policies, in turn, lead to further alienation and hatred of the regime, and subsequent radicalization. Currently, only a minority supports the more radical voices. In fact, a report released by the ICG in December 2003 revealed that only a fifth of Uzbeks even support representation of the Muslims in a form of a legal Islamic party⁵². Those figures might have changed since the repressive response of the government following March 2004 events.

Commentators share the view that the extreme totalitarian policies of the government create a vicious cycle of violence. It deepens social disenfranchisement and economic despair, diminishes trust in the state, and enhances discontent with the regime and support for radical voices who dare to challenge it and say the truth adamantly, in contrast to co-opted religious leaders who play the game by the rules of the regime. In addition, disillusionment with the Western governments who continue to backup the corrupt dictatorship financially and politically causes erosion of the self-proclaimed Western values of democracy⁵³. This situation, concomitantly with nil democratic outlets for protest and political opposition, provides a fertile ground for a militant opposition to grow and accumulate vast popular support from a population living in poverty and desperate for economic development, political alternative and reform⁵⁴.

In the words of a religious leader:

"If the negative tendencies in our society do not stop, and corruption, unemployment continue to grow, and the police continue to terrorize people, then in the place of state organs, underground anti-state structures will begin to emerge. This will happen not today, but when young people, who have passed through underground education in the humiliating conditions of suppression of Islam, and children, whose fathers sit in prison, mature politically. Then an explosive situation will arise"⁵⁵.

Ironically, violent opposition legitimizes the regime's justification to cracking down on the "extremists" and to exaggerating the threat posed by "Islamic terrorism", so

intimidating a threat for some actors in the international arena, and hence asking greater financial assistance to combat the global counter-terrorism battle⁵⁶. The money is used for the expansion of the security forces, and not for the democratic liberalization it is supposed to serve.

The solution does not lie in using more force. Only addressing the root causes of the emergence of armed opposition can pacify the turbulence. Meanwhile, it is likely that the IMU and other insurgents have positively influenced the population. In November 2004 there was an unprecedented mass demonstration of thousands of people against government's policies. Following the protests, political analysts observed that the situation was near the boiling point⁵⁷.

The IMU has a fundamental role in the mobilization of people to express their accumulated frustration and dare to protest. It was the first movement in Uzbekistan who dared to give voice to the voiceless, to cry out loud the truth that "the king is naked". Its armed attacks targeted police forces who terrorized an entire population, with minimal loss of lives of innocent civilians. Like any radical group, it pays the price. It has been depicted as hideous and extremely dangerous. At present, however, only the negative effects of its activities are evident, namely harder oppression of any Muslim resistance. Time will tell if the struggle of the IMU will lead to a positive effect wherein the radical path that the IMU chose will allow for moderate voices to be heard.

Notes

¹ Shermatova Sanobar, Russia's Motives in Kyrgyzstan Russia's intent in building an air base in Kyrgyzstan is clearly to counterbalance U.S. forces stationed in that region, Russia Weekly #237, December 25-31, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/237-13-pr.cfm>

² ICG, Central Asia, Islam and the State, July 10 2003, p. 2
http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/report_archive/A401032_30062003.pdf

³ I will further discuss the ideology of the IMU below.

⁴ Atal Subodh, Central Asian Geopolitics and U.S. Policy in the Region: The Post-11 September Era, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Volume 14, Number 2, Spring 2003, p. 98.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v014/14.2atal.html

⁵ Cornell, Svante E. and Spector, Regine A., Central Asia : More than Islamic Extremists, *The Washington Quarterly*, January 25, 2002. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.1cornell.html, p. 196

⁶ Bin-Laden allegedly appointed Namangani as his deputy just days before the 11 September attacks. See Atal, p.99

⁷ ICG, Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, November 26, 2001 , p. 1
http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400495_26112001-2.pdf

⁸ Jim Nichol, Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, The Congressional Research Service (CRS), May 18, 2001 http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/international/inter-76.cfm?&CFID=19454694&CFTOKEN=18990192#_1_12. The invasion to Kyrgyzstan according to Jim Nichol caused the flee of thousands of Kyrgyz from the area and was aimed to create an Islamic state in Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. I haven't found another support for this claim. Jim Nichol also suggests that the invasions in 1999 and 2000 were partly motivated by seizing control over drug routes.

⁹ Pannier Bruce, Uzbekistan: One Week Later, Many Questions Still Unanswered About Recent Violence, Russia Weekly no.18, April 9 2004, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/301-18.cfm>

¹⁰ MacLeod John and Bukharbaeva Galima, "Attacks by Islamist militants in the previously 'safe' haven of Uzbekistan are likely to unsettle both the region and its western friends", *The Guardian*, April 7, 2004

¹¹ Van der Schriek Daan, "Eurasia Insight The IMU: Fish in Search of a Sea" A EurasiaNet Partner Post from *TOL*, March 14, 2005, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp031405.shtml>

¹² Boucher, Richard, "Redesignation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a Foreign Terrorist Organization", The State Department of the United States, September 2002. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13708.htm

¹³ "Patterns of Global Terrorism", US Department of State, The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 29, 2004 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31621.htm>

¹⁴ General Hussein, the commander of the counter-insurgency operation in Pakistan, cited in Van der Schriek

¹⁵ Paton, *ibid*.

¹⁶ Pannier, *ibid*.

¹⁷ Behroz Khan, "the bureau chief of the Pakistani daily *The News* in Peshawar", quoted in Van der Schriek.

¹⁸ Blagov Sergei, "Moscow turns up heat on radicals", *Asia Times* no.8, July 22, 2003
<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7259-8.cfm>

¹⁹ Van der Schriek.

²⁰ ICG, "Central Asia, Islam and the State", p.3.

²¹ ICG, "Central Asia, Islam and the State", p.6

²² Opposition writers claim the incident was staged by elements within the regime in attempt to regain control for particular groups. See "ICG, Central Asia, Islam and the State", p.4.

²³ Paton.

²⁴ ICG, Central Asia, Islam and the State, p.11.

²⁵ ICG, Central Asia, Islam and the State, p.6

²⁶ ICG Briefing: Central Asia: Last Chance for Change, April 29, 2003, p. 1
http://www.icg.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400957_29042003.pdf

²⁷ Noorani, A.G., "Islam & Jihad: Prejudice versus Reality", Zed Books Ltd, London: 2002, p. 65

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- ²⁸ Noorani, p. 88
- ²⁹ *ibid*
- ³⁰ Noorani, p. 69
- ³¹ Van der Schriek.
- ³² This letter is the only primary source I managed to find. I bring it in full length.
- ³³ Burke Justin, Excerpts from report by Iranian radio from Mashhad, 14th August 2000
<http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200008/0026.html>
- ³⁴ I acknowledge the problematique in drawing my conclusions from only one primary source. Yet, I submit that analyzing both the letter and other activities alleged to the IMU with a critic eye, can lead to a different perspective, which is important be voiced.
- ³⁵ ICG, "Central Asia, Islam and the State", p.5.
- ³⁶ Macleod and Bukharbaeva.
- ³⁷ Starr heads the Central Asia Caudasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States.
- ³⁸ Pannier.
- ³⁹ Tarrow, S. 1989. "Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See a discussion in: Chetrit, Sami Shalom, "The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel", Am Oved Publishers Ltd, Tel Aviv 2004, p.16-20. Tarrow suggests a model consists of confrontational actions in incremental intensity and use of violent. The highest level of violence consists of incursions, fortifying oneself and attack against policemen, among other actions.
- ⁴⁰ Chetrit, Sami Shalom, "The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel", Am Oved Publishers Ltd, Tel Aviv 2004, p.26
- ⁴¹ Haines, H.H., 1988. "Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954-1970". Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, pp. 2-6. Cited in: Chetrit, Sami Shalom, "The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel", Am Oved Publishers Ltd, Tel Aviv 2004, p.26
- ⁴² Boucher.
- ⁴³ <http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1887>
- ⁴⁴ ICG, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement", December 22 2003, p. 2
http://www.icg.org/library/documents/asia/072_ca_is_radical_islam_inevitable.pdf
- ⁴⁵ Atal p. 99
- ⁴⁶ Bushkov Valentin, "The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Questions and Answers", 23.03.2001
http://greatgame.no.sapo.pt/acopiniao/islamic_movement_of_uzbekistan.htm.
- ⁴⁷ Atal p. 108
- ⁴⁸ The discourse on terror in Uzbekistan was intensified in 2001, as Uzbekistan was among the first states to join the US global war on terrorism. In august 2003, Tashkent was designated as the location for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. See Patterns of Global Terrorism.
- ⁴⁹ Stoner, Eric, "Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan Dictator, U.S. Ally", The Nonviolent Activist, the magazine of the War Resisters League, New York City, Winter 2005 <http://www.warresisters.org/nva.htm>
- ⁵⁰ Major powers such as China, Russia and notably the U.S., support militarily and financially Karimov's regime, for various reasons. The U.S. has geopolitical and economic interests in natural resources of Uzbekistan, among other interests. However, the scope of this paper is too narrow to allow for a deep discussion in the impact of major powers on the IMU.
- ⁵¹ ICG, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement", p. 8
- ⁵² *Ibid*, p. i
- ⁵³ As of December 2003, 60 percent of the population in Uzbekistan viewed the U.S. favorably. See ICG, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement", p. i. The current figures may be different.
- ⁵⁴ This view is repeatedly expressed by the ICG in all reports concerning IMU and cited in this paper.
- ⁵⁵ Interview with an imam held by ICG and quoted in ICG, Central Asia, Islam and the State, p. 12
- ⁵⁶ Macleod and Bukharbaeva
- ⁵⁷ The protest took place in Kokand in November 1 2004. Reportedly between 5,000 and 10,000 people demonstrated against new government restrictions on the market traders. It was hailed the largest demonstration against Karimov's government in a decade. According to Galima Bukharbaeva of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, the demonstrators were not merely protesting the trade restrictions, but also "called on officials to rein in the police, often criticized for excessively repressive behavior, and to 'free Muslims from jail.'" See Stoner.

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